Not sure if it's possible at all to give a not-purely-opinon-based answer on a "what do you think about these" type of question. But let's give it a try (in the mean time, it's not like Truecrypt magically ceased to work over night).
About the first alternative that you've listed, it does not so much matter where you host your website as it matters where you host your code.
But in the end, where you host your project (and website) does not make much of a difference anyway. If the bad guys from a three-letter US agency want to shut you down your project, they'll issue a warrant which your Swiss hoster will most likely follow to avoid embargo-like consequences. Or they'll simply kidnap your wife or your child and force you to build in a backdoor or take the site down (which makes having a transparent, non-anonymous developer team a brilliant idea, indeed!).
The project seems to have been set up by Thomas Bruderer, a former Pirate (political party) and follower of Richard Dawkins' theories. He (still) seems to expect an asteroid hitting Earth in April 2036, too, if I understand his personal website correctly.
All in all, the project site looks entusiastic and probably good-willed, but equally non-credible due to the great amount of naiveté expressed and the lack of actual development. The statement that hosting in Switzerland guarantees no problems with legal threats from the USA is outright ridiculous, and so far there seem to be no commits which are not imports of the original sources, a build fix for one Linux distro, and some formatting changes.
I'm not saying that this project couldn't become something good, but as it looks now I am not very ecstatic about it. Wait and see.
About the second one, GOST is pretty old (like, 40 years or so?) and pretty simple, has a well-known low avalanche, and a 64-bit block size. Yes, it uses a few more rounds to compensate for some of its weakness and has a 256-bit key, and as far as public knowledge goes, it has not been broken, but bleh.
Plus, the standard leaves some details (s-boxes) out. Such small details as what s-box to use may make a capital difference between an algorithm that is good and an algorithm that is totally unusable.
Using GOST feels somewhat like using DES, with the difference that GOST has not had a lot of attention from the cryptoanalysis community, but it has certainly seen intense attention from US spy agencies from the 1970s onwards. Using it solely because it is "non-NSA related" gives somewhat of a tinfoil-hat impression, even more so as there exist plenty of other "non-NSA related" algorithms that are not 40 years old and which do not have any obvious "Uh, I'm not sure if this will fly..." parts, and which have not been cryptoanalyzed by the exact guys you wish to defend against most for the last 40 years.